

















Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism 
DAVID LUBAN* 
I met Fred Zacharias near the start of his academic career, after his 
first publications on torts and on the First Amendment,1 but before he 
became a legal ethics scholar.  We met for the coincidental reason that
Fred and my wife were second cousins, and his family was spending the 
year in Washington; Fred and Sharon invited us to dinner.  I had already 
been working on legal ethics for several years, and Fred was becoming 
interested.  I am unsure whether he had already begun his research on 
lawyer confidentiality, but within a year he sent me the draft of 
Rethinking Confidentiality, eventually published in two parts.2 
The confidentiality articles were a sensational start to an illustrious career. 
Fred conducted the first and one of the best empirical studies of 
confidentiality in years, surveying lawyers and clients in Tompkins
County, New York, about what lawyers actually told clients about 
confidentiality and its exceptions, and what difference the exceptions 
made in whether clients withheld information from their lawyers.  Of
course, the standard justification for strong protection of client 
confidences is that without it, clients would withhold vital information
from their lawyers.3  This justification rests on empirical claims about
* University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown 
University Law Center.  Thanks to Bruce Green and Deborah L. Rhode for their comments 
on my draft. 
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
936 (1987); Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986). 
2. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989); Fred 
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA 
L. REV. 601 (1990). 
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2010) 
(“[Confidentiality] contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer
























   
 
   
  
  
   
  
    
   
   
 
   
  
 
lawyer and client behavior that had never really been tested—they were
always accepted as a matter of what might be called faith, common
sense, or professional ideology.  Fred’s Tompkins County Study showed
that in fact clients frequently misunderstood the limits of confidentiality,
lawyers were seldom accurate in explaining them, and in any event 
clients revealed facts to their lawyers because they trust them as
professionals, not because of confidentiality rules.4  Although Fred
believed that the results of the study were not necessarily inconsistent
with the dominant theory,5 they were counterintuitive and very important.
Unsurprisingly, the articles have been cited hundreds of times. 
Following this remarkable debut, Fred focused his energy almost
entirely on ethics and began a remarkable outpouring of scholarship.  He 
published sixty law review articles, almost all of them quite
substantial—even his short forewords to law review symposia were
thoughtful and worthwhile.6  About a decade after the confidentiality 
articles, Fred began his collaboration with Bruce Green, and between
2001 and 2009, they published ten splendid articles together, including
five on the role and regulation of prosecutors.7  This was surely the most
successful collaboration ever in the field of professional responsibility.  I
once asked Bruce how it is that they agreed about so much, and he 
laughed.  “Fred and I disagree about everything,” he answered.  “We 
argue it out, and those are the arguments that go into the articles.”  Even
the onset of Fred’s illness did not stop him.  Incredibly, Fred published 
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject 
matter.  The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary,
to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct.”). 
4. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 2, at 381. 
5. See id. 
6. For a list of Professor Zacharias’s law review articles, see Frank Partnoy, A 
List, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (2011). 
7. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, “Anything Rather than a
Deliberate and Well-Considered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal
Court Authority To Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1303 (2003); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial 
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing 
Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce
A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1 (2005); Bruce A. 
Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
381 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 
88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys 
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half a dozen articles in 20098 and one posthumously in 2010, completed
at Fred’s request by his colleagues Shaun P. Martin and Frank Partnoy.9 
In their words, “It is a testament to, and typical of, Professor Zacharias 
that even in the final days of his life, he wanted to complete his 
academic work and fulfill what he felt were his obligations to the law
review students who had accepted his piece.”10  Despite his illness, the
article displayed no falling off in his creativity: quite the contrary.  It
elaborates an unexpected but convincing analogy between baseball’s
steroid scandal and the professional regulation of lawyers;11 I will
discuss it shortly.  We owe Professors Martin and Partnoy a debt of
gratitude for preparing it for publication. 
A true scholar like Fred would want to be remembered for his work. 
This is not the place for a full overview—and in any event, a full
overview of such a large body of work is hardly possible.  Instead, I will 
simply discuss some of the themes to which Fred kept circling back,
with some illustrations drawn from my own favorites among his articles. 
In places, I will also do him the courtesy of criticizing his views. That, 
too, is the way a scholar wants to be honored. 
In one way, the Tompkins County Study is unrepresentative of Fred’s
scholarship.  At heart, he was not a social scientist or legal empiricist. 
Nor was he a doctrinalist, in the familiar sense of an analyst of case law.
Neither did Fred consider himself a moral philosopher—although in my
experience, Fred had a sophisticated understanding of philosophical
arguments.  Rather, he was a theoretician of professional regulation who
examined large moral and philosophical topics through the lens of the 
regulatory codes and the arguments of principle and policy that underlie 
them.  A strong moral vision pervades his writing: he saw the regulatory
enterprise as a moral one through and through.  If he did not often say so
explicitly, it is because he abhorred pretensions, and typically took a 
8. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 
(2009); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty To Avoid 
Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1147 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of Lawyers in a
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591 (2009). 
9. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers 
Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (2010). 
10. Id. at 671 (in memoriam tribute to Professor Zacharias from Professors Shaun
P. Martin and Frank Partnoy). 






















   
 
  
deflationary stance toward them in his writing.  He continually came up
with creative ways to think about ethics issues, but he elaborated them in
a careful, analytical way, and took pains not to overclaim.  One of the 
characteristic vices of legal scholarship is the tendency to jump from 
single instances—a Supreme Court decision, a newsworthy story, a
scandal—to large, portentous general conclusions.  Fred’s skeptical cast
of mind was always in the opposite direction: to show that large-scale
generalizations blur significant distinctions and that the yen for global 
scope misses a more complex reality.  Montaigne wrote, in a comically 
self-referential sentence, “All judgments in gross are loose and imperfect.”12 
Fred would have agreed wholeheartedly with the sentiment. 
His final article illustrates his way of thinking beautifully.  His chief 
target is rational choice or “bad man” theories of ethical regulation, 
which “assume that ethics provisions that do not result in discipline have 
little, or perhaps even counterproductive, effects.”13  And yet legal ethics 
codes are filled with hortatory, unenforceable—or barely enforceable— 
rules.  Does this signify a regulatory mistake by code drafters—perhaps
even a self-interested desire by lawyers to avoid enforceable rules?  Fred
argues that the answer is “no” and suggests that we look at baseball’s
steroids scandals to see why not.14  Although some ballplayers jumped 
on the performance-enhancing drugs bandwagon with no apparent 
reservations, many did not.  Fred classifies ballplayers into five categories: 
cheaters—the classical “bad [men]”; those who did not cheat because
they thought the costs outweighed the benefits—“Complementary 
Rational Actor[s]”; or because they factored in reputational costs— 
“Nuanced Rational Actor[s]”; or because they self-consciously value
law-abiding behavior—“Clean Rational Actors”; or because they
unquestioningly follow rules—“Socialized Persons.”15 Clearly, a similar 
typology of lawyers exists, to which Fred adds one further category,
those who are willing to violate codes when they believe morality
compels it—“Moral Cheater[s].”16  Although the cheaters will simply 
ignore hortatory or unenforced rules, code drafters must consider that 
lawyers who fall into the other categories may well guide their behavior 
by hortatory rules, or discretionary rules that implicitly call for non-self-
interested judgment.  Bad man theories of rational choice oversimplify
12. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of the Art of Discussion, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF 
MONTAIGNE 703, 721 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958) (1585). 
13. Zacharias, supra note 9, at 672. 
14. The example is dear to my own heart. See generally David Luban & Daniel 
Luban, Cheating in Baseball, in  THE  CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO  BASEBALL (Leonard 
Cassuto & Stephen Partridge eds., forthcoming Feb. 2011). 
15. See Zacharias, supra note 9, at 679. 
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the moral world by supposing that only the first category matters. 
Although only a fool would deny the existence of “bad men” in the legal 
profession—and, therefore, only a fool would deny that enforceable
rules with real consequences belong in the code—other rules also have
their place, directed to the other categories of lawyers.  The point of the
steroids analogy is that it illustrates that the noncheaters were a 
prominent category even in a highly competitive market with millions of 
salary dollars at stake. 
This final article revisits themes that Fred, both in his solo-authored 
work and in his collaboration with Bruce Green, discussed more than 
once.  Together, they provided a pioneering analysis of permissive rules 
in the ethics codes.17  Permissive rules, for example, rules permitting but
not requiring lawyers to reveal client confidences under specified
circumstances, rely on lawyers’ discretion over when to avail themselves
of the permission; they are rules directed to what, in another article,
Green and Zacharias label a lawyer’s “professional conscience.”18  In  
Integrity Ethics, Fred once again argues that lawyer regulatory codes
contain, and should contain, multiple categories of rules.19  Fred first 
singles out several categories of what he calls “rules of role,” which
define the various roles lawyers must play: as clients’ agents or champions, 
as officers of the court, and as fair players.20  In addition, there are rules 
that adjust the roles to certain special situations, without wholly redefining
the roles.21  But beyond all of these role-related rules, American ethics
codes have always included “integrity rules” that mesh lawyers’ roles 
with non-role-related standards of conduct.  Some aim to mesh lawyers’ 
professional responsibilities with other bodies of civil and criminal law,
but others “highlight aspects of morality that the drafters assume are
simply part and parcel of good citizenship, which lawyers should not 
cede merely because they are assigned particular tasks in the legal 
system.”22  Fred argues that rules of role are often counterintuitive, in the
sense that they impose obligations that sometimes clash with lay moral 
intuitions, for example, that lawyers must keep information confidential
17. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006). 
18. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2005). 
19. Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541 (2009). 
20. See id. at 554. 
21. See id. at 555–56. 



















   
   
even when it pertains to a client’s past crimes.23  Because rules of role
can be counterintuitive, code drafters must make them as specific and 
enforceable as possible.24  Integrity rules, by contrast, function so that
lawyers do not “carry too far the notion that they are unique moral 
actors.  A core purpose of the codes is to put lawyers on the same moral
footing as everyone else.”25 These rules may be more hortatory, general, 
or discretionary than the rules of role.  Fred argues that they should not 
be drafted in precise and enforceable terms because their principal
function is to remind lawyers that their roles have boundaries.26  He  
offers an in-depth analysis of the implications his distinctions carry for 
rule drafters, which I shall not summarize here.  This article strikes me
as very characteristic of Fred’s procedures.  He takes a large topic about 
which a great deal has been written—integrity in the legal profession— 
and transposes it from a set of imponderable generalities to discrete 
issues of professional regulation that can be subjected to detailed 
analysis. 
Although my main purposes in this brief Article are not critical, I must 
add that in my view Fred did not go far enough in examining the 
function of integrity rules.  One important legal question is always what
effect rules have on how we should interpret other rules.  Here it seems 
to me that integrity rules can serve as an interpretive guide to rules of
role, a point that Fred does not consider in Integrity Ethics. 
As an example, I would offer an opinion written by the D.C. Bar’s
Ethics Committee on the issue of whether it is unethical for lawyers to
peek at metadata embedded in documents sent to them by counsel for
other parties.27  Metadata include information about who wrote a 
document and when, changes from earlier drafts, and comments by
additional readers.  Ordinarily they are invisible, but it is easy to retrieve
them.  A lawyer who unthinkingly sends a contract draft, for example, to 
another party without scrubbing the metadata gives that party a chance 
to see what might turn out to be vital confidential information.  The 
question of whether to peek at the metadata is a technologically current 
version of whether to read an “errant fax” mistakenly sent by an adversary, 
or—more fancifully—whether to paw through the briefcase that the 
adversary carelessly left unlocked on the table while taking a bathroom
break. 
23. See id. at 566. 
24. See id. 
25. Id. 
26. See id. at 571–75. 
27. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar. 
org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm (discussing the review and use 
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I was a member of the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee as it considered
the metadata issue, in an opinion that required hours of discussion and
many drafts—discussions which, I hasten to add, were not confidential: 
our committee meetings are open to the public.  All members of the 
committee agreed that the sending lawyer has a duty to scrub metadata 
from documents before transmitting them; that is a straightforward
corollary of the duty to keep client confidences.  The hard part was
determining the obligation of the receiving lawyer.  To peek or not to 
peek, that is the question.  One could argue that rule 1.3’s requirement of 
diligence on behalf of the client actually obligates lawyers to peek at
metadata.28  However, the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct contain a 
specific no-peek rule for the “errant fax” problem:
A lawyer who receives a writing relating to the representation of a client and
knows, before examining the writing, that it has been inadvertently sent, shall
not examine the writing, but shall notify the sending party and abide by
the instructions of the sending party regarding the return or destruction
of the writing.29 
The problem is that the rule is too specifically geared toward the errant
fax problem, and on its face, it does not prohibit examining the metadata 
in a writing unless the writing was inadvertently sent.  Plainly, this rule 
is precisely drafted and not at all hortatory—it is an example of a rule of 
role, belonging in Fred’s category of rules of fair play.  Because it does 
not explicitly prohibit peeking at metadata and carries punitive 
consequences, one might argue that it must be strictly construed.  Under 
the expressio unis canon, the rule must be read to permit rather than 
forbid peeking at metadata.
But several committee members insisted that a lawyer of integrity 
simply does not go around looking through other peoples’ briefcases,
even though doing so may help the client—nor should a lawyer peek at 
metadata.  Such conduct, even though not expressly prohibited, is 
dishonest, and violates rule 8.4(c)’s ban on deceit and dishonesty.30 
28. As the D.C. Bar’s opinion notes, citing an earlier opinion, “[W]here the privileged
nature of the document is not apparent on its face, there is no obligation to refrain from 
reviewing it, and the duty of diligent representation under D.C. Rule 1.3 may trump 
confidentiality concerns.”  Id.  Our opinion did not discuss one thorny issue: whether, if
lawyers are forbidden from peeking at the metadata, clients can demand that their lawyers 
send copies of the documents to them so that the clients can do what the lawyers cannot. 
29. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010). 
30. The opinion distinguishes between peeking at metadata in documents that an
















   
     
 
 
    
 
 






Once the committee agreed on that conclusion—and it took some
discussion to get there—we concluded that the dishonesty of peeking 
should affect our reading of rule 4.4(b): we should read rule 4.4(b)
broadly rather than narrowly.  And that is what we did: the published 
version of the opinion reasons that “[a]lthough the purpose of Rule 
4.4(b) was to address the inadvertent disclosure of entire documents
(whether electronic or paper), we see no reason why it would not also
apply to an inadvertently transmitted portion of a writing that is 
otherwise intentionally sent”—the metadata portion.31  In other words,
we used the integrity-based rule 8.4(c) as an interpretive guide to the 
rule of role.32  This is not a preordained conclusion: one could readily 
argue it the other way around and insist that rule 8.4(c) should be read
narrowly.  Fred’s vision of integrity rules as reminders that role is not 
everything lends itself, I think, to the committee’s approach rather than
the alternative.  It seems to me that Fred’s analysis could readily have
been expanded to include discussion of integrity rules as interpretive 
guides to rules of role. 
I also think that integrity rules could form a firmer basis for discipline 
than Fred acknowledges.  A case in point is Model Rule 2.1 and its state 
equivalents.  This rule, governing lawyers in their role as client advisers,
requires lawyers to offer candid and independent advice.33  I have argued
in several venues that the so-called torture memos written by lawyers in 
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) violated rule 
2.1 by providing grossly distorted legal advice on the legality of CIA 
interrogation techniques.34 The Justice Department’s Office of Professional 
See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 27.  For documents in the former category, the
metadata may have evidentiary force, and in such cases it is not prohibited to search and
examine the metadata.  My discussion in this Article concerns documents 
outside this category.
31. See id. (footnote omitted). 
32. And, of course, the other way around: it was partly because of the similarity 
between peeking at metadata and the conduct prohibited by D.C. Rule 4.4(b) that
we concluded that peeking at metadata is dishonest.  I regard this as a virtuous, not a 
vicious, circle. 
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010). 
34. I first made the argument in David Luban, Selling Indulgences, SLATE (Feb. 
14, 2005, 6:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2113447/.  I subsequently developed it in 
DAVID  LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND  HUMAN DIGNITY 157–58, 192–202 (2007); David 
Luban, Tales of Terror: Lessons for Lawyers from the ‘War on Terrorism,’ in REAFFIRMING 
LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 56 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); 
Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration 
Interrogation Rules: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights &
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 15–16 (2008) (testimony
of David Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); and—in greater 
detail—What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush














   
 
   
 
  
















[VOL. 48:  303, 2011] Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Responsibility (OPR) report on the torture memos agreed and
recommended referring two of the memos’ authors for professional 
discipline.35  The client plainly wanted the advice: according to a Senate 
Intelligence Committee report, OLC approval was the last hurdle before 
beginning the “enhanced” interrogation of the prisoner Abu Zubaydah.36 
In my view, a lawyer cannot distort legal advice to give the client what 
he wants.  Doing so violates rule 2.1.
However, Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis 
rejected OPR’s finding of misconduct and also its use of Model Rule 
2.1;37 he concluded that the rule 2.1 theory fails to set out “a known and
unambiguous obligation or standard.”38  I disagree and think the
Margolis Memo is deeply flawed.39  The torture memos omitted to 
mention significant adverse case law, misrepresented at least one source 
that it cited by attributing the opposite view to what it actually said at the 
page cited, and offered bizarre statutory interpretations.40  This can  
S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of David Luban, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center) (on file with author).
35. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT: INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO 
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 16–17, 21–22, 254–60 (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.  In the interest of candor, I should report that 
former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey and Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip 
assert that OPR drew on my analysis, and they criticize the OPR Report for failing to disclose 
that I am not a lawyer and was a critic (“to be sure, thoughtful and sincere, but longtime”) of
the Bush Administration.  Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney Gen. & Mark Filip,
Deputy Attorney Gen., to H. Marshall Jarrett, Counsel, Office of Prof’l Responsibility 7–8
(Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mukasey-Filip090119.
pdf. I can attest that no OPR personnel ever discussed their investigation or anything else
with me, and I had no inkling that OPR’s report would cite my work. 
36. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 111TH CONG., RELEASE OF 
DECLASSIFIED NARRATIVE DESCRIBING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL 
COUNSEL’S OPINIONS ON THE CIA’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 3–4
(2009), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf. 
37. Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., to the 
Attorney Gen. & the Deputy Attorney Gen. 14–24 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf. 
38. Id. at 10. 
39. For my rejoinder to the Margolis Memorandum, see David Luban, David 
Margolis Is Wrong, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2245531. 
40. I discuss the gory details in the sources cited in supra note 34, especially my 
Senate testimony.  In brief, the significant omissions are United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490–91 (2001), which expresses doubts, although reserves
the question, whether a necessity defense exists in federal criminal law unless explicitly
















    
  
    
 
 
   
 
hardly be squared with the injunction to give candid and independent 
advice; the standard is simply not that ambiguous. 
Fred wrote about the “torture memo” issue but concluded that rule 2.1 
offers scant constraint on the authors of the torture memoranda; his view 
is closer to that of Mr. Margolis’s than to mine or to that of the OPR 
Report, which had not been released at the time Fred wrote.41  This  
conclusion is in line with his analysis of integrity rules in general, which 
holds that integrity rules such as rule 2.1 are largely hortatory and should 
not be enforced.  However, rather than appeal to his overall regulatory 
philosophy, Fred offered more specific arguments.  One is that John
Yoo, the author of the best-known torture memos, may have been asked
only “to identify the best arguments supporting the interrogation tactics 
in question” rather than to objectively evaluate the law.42  Nothing in
rule 2.1 prohibits a lawyer from answering the narrower question.
As a matter of fact, however, the memos themselves deny that they are
addressing the narrower question.  Professor Yoo’s August 1, 2002, 
“techniques” memorandum instead states, “We wish to emphasize that
this is our best reading of the law,”43 while Mr. Bradbury describes his 
May 10, 2005, “techniques” memorandum in similar terms: “the legal
standards we apply in this memorandum . . . constitute our authoritative 
view of the legal standards applicable under [the torture statutes].”44  It is 
very likely Fred had not read these memos at the time he was preparing 
his article—they were not released until spring of 2009.  But I believe 
that even under Fred’s hypothetical he reached the wrong answer.  OLC 
opinions bind the executive branch, and OLC is charged with the
President’s constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the law. A 
request by the client to provide arguments for only one side of a crucial 
which finds that President Truman’s commander-in-chief power did not authorize
otherwise-unlawful seizure of steel mills; Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177– 
78 (1804), which holds that President Adams’s authority as commander in chief could
not authorize the seizure of a ship contrary to an act of Congress; and United States v. 
Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984), which calls waterboarding “torture.”  Each of these 
cases undermines major arguments in the torture memorandum, but the memorandum 
cited none of them. 
41. See Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 333, 348–50 (2009). 
42. See id. at 349. 
43. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to John
Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel for the CIA, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 
2002), reprinted in  THE TORTURE  MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 127
(David Cole ed., 2009). 
44. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to John
A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to
Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda 
Detainee (May 10, 2005), reprinted in  THE  TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE 
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legal issue is a request for OLC to violate its obligations; given the 
binding power of OLC opinions, the request would be wholly out of order.
Fred also believed that Professor Yoo may well have satisfied the 
requirement of candor because he believed the views in the torture 
memos—as he has vehemently asserted.45  It is indeed incumbent on any 
disciplinary authority to prove the requisite mens rea for a disciplinary 
infraction.  That is not a problem with rule 2.1, however.  Mental states
are hard to prove, and it would be harder still to prove that a lawyer who 
has written an elaborate legal opinion justifying the lawyer’s
conclusions—and who stands by it—did not actually believe what was 
in those opinions.  Hard, but not impossible: the question for the fact 
finder would turn on whether omitting all discussion of key adverse case 
law was really based on a good faith belief that it is irrelevant. 
My hesitations about Fred’s analysis of integrity rules should not
mask my main point, however: Fred’s regulatory philosophy, grounded
in a very deep understanding of the moral significance of different 
categories of rules, is a notable and very important achievement. 
I mentioned earlier that Fred and Bruce Green attach special
significance to permissive or discretionary rules of ethics—a category
that overlaps substantially with integrity rules.  That is because they see 
the exercise of professional discretion, constrained by the basic contours 
of the lawyer’s role, as the heart of professional conscience.  They argue
this point in one of their most significant articles, Reconceptualizing 
Advocacy Ethics.46  This article aims at a goal Fred refers to often in his
writing: to stake out a middle position between two extremes regarding 
the relationship between a lawyer’s role morality and extralegal 
morality.47  One position, sometimes identified with the work of Monroe
Freedman, places zealous advocacy on the client’s behalf in a paramount, 
trumping position over extralegal moral values.48  The other, sometimes 
identified with the work of William Simon and me, gives primacy to the 
pursuit of justice (Simon) or morality (Luban).49  Zacharias and Green 
seek to identify a middle position between the two—a role within our 
legal tradition for a “professional conscience” that is more tied with the
45. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 180–87 (2006). 
46. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 18. 
47. See id. at 44–45. 
48. See id. at 44 & n.257. 


























     
 
lawyer’s role than personal conscience but that nevertheless constrains
lawyers in pursuing client interests.50  In their words, professional 
conscience pertains to “uncodified but nonetheless enforceable limits on
advocacy and partisanship.”51  They locate a paradigm for this notion of 
professional conscience in an important 1845 decision by Chief Justice 
Gibson in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Rush v. Cavenaugh.52  The
case involved a lawyer who refused to conduct a prosecution on behalf
of a private client when he concluded that it was baseless.53  After the 
client branded him a professional cheat, the lawyer sued for defamation,
and the court concluded that it must decide whether the lawyer had acted 
properly by abandoning the prosecution—while nevertheless billing the 
client for services rendered.54  Zacharias and Green provide an interesting 
historical account of why the case is important and a novel interpretation 
of it.  The most important point, though, is their discussion of the 
meaning of “professional conscience.”  Crucially, it is not the same as
“personal conscience,” that is, norms of common morality.  The latter 
reflects “individual, subjective ethical perspectives”;55 elsewhere, Fred 
uses the phrase “idiosyncratic unbounded notions of right and wrong.”56 
In Chief Justice Gibson’s conception, there is nothing subjective or 
idiosyncratic about professional conscience: the “professional requirement
of conscience apparently dictated only one course of conduct,”57 namely
that the attorney must not continue in a prosecution that the attorney
knew was unfounded.  In line with the themes I have emphasized in this
Article, Zacharias and Green locate professional conscience in the
discretionary rules of professional codes, which set parameters for the
execution of the lawyer’s role but delegate to lawyers the hard moral
deliberation about which actions within these parameters fulfill their 
duty as officers of the court.58  I am not certain whether they agree with 
Chief Justice Gibson that professional conscience inevitably dictates
“only one right course of conduct,” but it is central to their vision that 
professional conscience is neither individual nor subjective, unlike
personal conscience, and it gives content to the concept of an “officer of
the court.” 
50. See id. at 45. 
51. Id. at 50. 
52. Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187 (1845). 
53. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 18, at 6. 
54. See id. 
55. Green & Zacharias, supra note 18, at 22. 
56. Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 
191, 208 (2001). 
57. Green & Zacharias, supra note 18, at 22. 
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Again, my primary aim in the present Article is not critical, but I do 
want to offer my rejoinder to their critique of my own approach, which
gives primacy to extra-professional morality.  The rejoinder consists in
three points.  First, what Zacharias and Green label personal conscience is
no more individual and subjective than professional conscience.  There 
is nothing subjective about basic moral norms such as the duty to respect
the human dignity of all people, including the adversary, or the 
requirement not to inflict grievous harm on the innocent.  Time-honored
moral requirements of honesty, benevolence, and reciprocity have at 
least as strong a claim to objective validity as any norms of professional
conscience.  Although it is true that reasonable people may disagree 
about what these norms require in hard cases, the same is surely true of
discretionary professional norms.  Second, what Zacharias and Green
call personal conscience is not something we can simply set aside—it 
comes with the territory of being a human agent.59  This gives it a certain 
primacy over professional conscience: we can walk away from a
profession, but we cannot walk away from ourselves.  Thus, third, in 
cases where moral norms conflict with the professional rules of conduct,
the question always arises of whether to conscientiously disobey the 
rules, and the answer cannot be a blanket “no.” 
Fred did not disagree with the latter conclusion.  In his admirable 
article on lawyers as conscientious objectors, he insists that “no one has 
ever suggested that blind adherence to a professional code in a particular
situation involving moral issues necessarily is ethical in the general
sense.”60  He proposes three requirements that would normally be necessary 
to justify conscientious disobedience to a legal and professional norm.
First: 
For a lawyer’s beliefs to begin to rise to the level justifying conscientious
objection, the lawyer must be able to identify a specific religious or religious-
equivalent creed that governs the situation . . . .
. . . .
. . . [A]s a participant in the legal system, a lawyer-objector should consider
departing from the legal rules only when she can point to a specific core belief 
that controls her everyday behavior in more than an ephemeral sense.  A deep-
seated belief that she should not kill or tell a lie might qualify, while a belief that
she should “be a good person” hardly helps her distinguish appropriate conduct in a
59. For my most recent effort to make the case for moral activism, see David 
Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1437, 1438–44 (2008). 






















    
 






measurable way.  In general, the lawyer should not depart from the codes on the 
basis of a generalized sense of her superior moral capacity.61 
Second, a lawyer should take steps to minimize whatever damage her 
disobedience causes.62  And third, she ordinarily ought to disobey 
publicly, which entails a willingness to accept the consequences.63 
These conditions are entirely plausible.  But notice that Fred does
accept the ultimate primacy of personal conscience over professional 
obligation, at least in the subset of cases that meet the three conditions. 
In my view, that concession softens the distinction between Green and 
Zacharias’s theory of professional conscience and views such as mine.
To the extent Green and Zacharias believe that personal and professional 
conscience complement each other, I agree with them, and to the extent 
they accept that in cases where personal and professional conscience
conflict, personal conscience may rightly prevail, they agree with me.
Any appreciation of Fred’s work must include prosecutorial ethics.
By my count, he published ten articles on the subject, five in 
collaboration with Bruce Green and five on his own.64  They include an
extraordinarily fine article on plea bargaining,65 but the article I wish to
focus on is his first on the subject, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial 
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?66  Here, Fred considered 
the meaning of the slogan that prosecutors should seek justice, not
victory.67  The dictum is intuitive, and enormously suggestive, but it is
very hard to say exactly what it means.  So far as I know, Fred’s article
was the first to tackle the problem.68 Fred’s view is modest and 
procedural: for him, the duty to seek justice “has two fairly limited
prongs: (1) prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a good 
faith belief that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must ensure 
that the basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial.”69  Or at  
any rate it seems modest and procedural if one focuses only on the
61. Id. at 208–09. 
62. See id. at 218. 
63. See id. 
64. See supra note 7. 
65. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1121 (1998). 
66. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
67. It appears in various forms in the MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
cmt. (2010); the MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982); and the
ABA’s STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993).  Its ancestor is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
68. For another noteworthy attempt, written eight years later, see Bruce A. Green, 
Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612–13 (1999). 
























   
 




   
[VOL. 48:  303, 2011] Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
second clause.  The first clause turns out not to be modest at all. 
Presumably it means that prosecutors should not prosecute crime C
unless they have a good faith belief that the defendant has committed C, 
as charged in the indictment—not just another crime like C.  It follows 
that a prosecutor cannot prosecute someone for dealing drugs if the 
prosecutor thinks the defendant did not do it this time, even if the
prosecutor is absolutely certain that the defendant is a drug dealer, and 
even if the prosecutor thinks the state could win the case.  No mental
gymnastics along the lines of, “He may not have really done it this time, 
but he does the same thing all the time.”  Nor can a prosecutor overcharge a
case in order to induce a plea bargain or to flip the defendant.  Nor,
finally, can a prosecutor with honest doubts about the case proceed with
it and “let the jury decide.”70 
The second clause, modest as it seems, exhibits one of Fred’s 
characteristic views: a commitment to the value of procedural justice,
coupled with a skepticism about the direct pursuit of substantive justice. 
After all, some commentators might read “seek justice not victory” as a
demand that prosecutors do what they can to seek the legally just
outcome.71  This assumes that prosecutors are able to tell what the
legally just outcome is.  Sometimes, no doubt, that is true.72  But, just as
Fred had real doubts about lawyers imposing their demands of personal 
conscience on clients, he had real doubts about anyone’s ability to
discern legal justice better than a well-functioning legal process.  A
prosecutor who decides to seek legal justice regardless of procedural 
niceties might just as readily turn out to be a prosecutor who cuts corners 
to obtain convictions as a prosecutor who refrains from unjust prosecutions. 
70. This is contrary to the well-known view of H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous 
Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
1145, 1156–59 (1973).  The ABA’s STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION take a weaker stand than Fred Zacharias: Standard 3-
3.9 requires a prosecutor to refrain from prosecution without probable cause, but “the 
prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty” is merely a discretionary
factor when a prosecutor is deciding whether to press charges.  ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(b) 
(1993). 
71. This is the view of WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY 
OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998).  Simon generalizes the “seek justice not victory” dictum from
prosecutors to lawyers in general and argues that the “justice” to be sought is substantive legal 
justice. See id. at 9–11. 














    
 
 
        
 
   
 




   
 
 
Something of this same skepticism about lawyers’ direct or overt 
efforts to achieve moral ends appears in one of Fred’s last—and most
pessimistic—essays, True Confessions About the Role of Lawyers in a 
Democracy.73  A former public interest lawyer himself, Fred had high 
hopes that practicing law could lead to progressive social change.  Over
time, these hopes came to seem “more wistful than realistic.”74  The  
pursuit of client interests can actually undermine public interests, and 
public interest law practice need not be progressive, as the flourishing 
conservative public interest bar demonstrates.  People’s ideas about 
democracy vary widely, and the progressive vision of American democracy
is only one of them.75  As for a professional obligation to protect and 
enhance democracy, it is simply arrogant for lawyers to assume that their
profession has a deeper obligation—or better insight into the requirements 
of democracy—than anyone else.76 
The one thing that lawyers are particularly good at, Fred argues, is 
recognizing and protecting the process values that constitute the rule of 
law.  In his view, the rule of law is not necessarily democratic: “the rule 
of law seems to be neutral as between democracy and tyranny, serving 
either equally well.”77  But it may well be that constitutional democracy 
is impossible without the rule of law, and that is reason enough for 
lawyers in a constitutional democracy to work to maintain it.78  Fred’s  
conclusion is this: 
Therefore, to the extent that lawyer involvement in producing social reform is 
important, our time may be better spent on identifying those limited enterprises 
for which lawyers are uniquely qualified and on developing mechanisms for
encouraging lawyers to engage in those enterprises voluntarily.  If I am correct
that finding agreement about values inherent in all true democracies is nearly
impossible, it seems anomalous to pursue the second order question of whether
lawyers have a special obligation to those values.  Rather, we should acknowledge 
that lawyers’ contributions to democracy will stem from lawyers’ individual moral 
decisions to act. This in turn would force us to justify particular endeavors as
warranting the special attention of the bar.79 
This paragraph explains a great deal about the ambition of Fred’s work. 
The moral impulse is evident and strong—but so is the skepticism that
direct, overt moralizing will do much good.  A lawyer’s contributions 
73. Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of Lawyers in a Democracy, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591 (2009). 
74. Id. at 1599. 
75. See id. at 1603. 
76. See id. at 1601–02. 
77. Id. at 1606.  I do not agree with Fred on this point; instead, following Lon
Fuller, I believe that tyrannies inevitably find the rule of law a constricting nuisance.  Id. 
at 1605. 
78. See id. at 1606. 
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come from an individual moral decision to act—but taking such a 
decision as a lawyer puts the onus on that lawyer to justify the special 
attention of the bar.  Inevitably, that presses lawyers toward those
limited endeavors—paradigmatically, enhancing the rule of law—that 
lawyers are good at.  Personal conscience transmutes into professional
conscience.  Much of Fred’s writing can be understood as the manifestation 
of his own professional conscience.  In a brief essay, Fred explained that
the reason legal practitioners need academics is that—contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that professors don’t understand the “real
world”—it is more often the practitioners than the academics who 
engage in “wistful idealizations about the legal profession.”80  In his 
view, “the bar often needs law professors to bring its approaches back to 
earth.”81  Fred saw his job as bringing ethics to earth.  He did it in a 
wise, knowledgeable, tough-minded, and inventive way.  His loss is a 
great one. 
80. Fred C. Zacharias, Why the Bar Needs Academics—And Vice Versa, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 701, 702 (2003). 
81. Id. 
319
 320
